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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-PARTICULAR

EXPRESSIONS

AND

LIMITATIONS-NORTH DAKOTA STATUTE REQUIRING DISCLOSURE OF
THE IDENTITY OF SPONSORS OF CAMPAIGN LITERATURE

REGARDING

INITIATED MEASURES IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The North Dakota Education Association (NDEA) 1 was
convicted of violating a statutory requirement which required
sponsors of political advertisements to identify themselves. 2 The
conviction was the result of an advertisement in a NDEA
3
publication asking voters to vote "no" on an initiated measure.
The publication did not contain "the name or names of the sponsor
of such advertisement. "4 The primary sponsor of the initiated
measure signed a complaint against the NDEA alleging a violation
of the North Dakota statute. 5 The case went to trial before a jury
1. State v. North Dakota Educ. Ass'n., 262 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978). The North Dakota
Education Association (NDEA) is an association of a great majority of the classroom teachers in
North Dakota. Id. at 732.
2. Id. The statute under which the NDEA was convicted was N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-20-17.1
(1969) which provides as follows:
Each and every political advertisement, whether on behalf of or in opposition to any
candadate for public office, initiated measure, referred measure or constitutional
amendment, and whether such advertisement shall be by newspaper, pamphlet, or
folder, display cards, signs, posters or billboard advertisements, or by any other public
means, shall disclose at the bottom of same the name or names of the sponsors of such
advertisement, and the name or names of the person, persons, associations, partnerships or corporations paying for such advertisement, except however, this section
shall not apply to campaign buttons. At the close of every radio or television broadcast
containing any advertising announcements or talk for or against any candidate for
public office, any initiated measure, referred measure, or constitutional amendment to
be voted on by the people, there shall be a announced at the close of said broadcast the
name or names of the person, persons, associations, partnerships or corporations
paying for such radio or television broadcast.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-20-17.1 (Supp. 1975) is exactly like the 1969 provision under which NDEA
was convicted, except that the latter version required the sponsors to put their addresses on the
publication in addition to their names.
3. 262 N.W.2d at 732. The measure to be voted on Initiated Measure No. 1, would have limited
the state's total expenditures in each biennium. The NDEA distributes a publication known as the
"North Dakota Education News" six times a year to its members and to other associations on its
exchange list, to newspapers, radio and television stations, to all legislators, and to all libraries
throughout the state. The publication involved in this case was an additional one distributed once a
year to all classroom teachers in North Dakota, members and nonmembers alike. Id.
4. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 16-20-17.1 (1969).
5. 262 N.W.2d at 732. Mr. Robert McCarney, the primary sponsor ot Initiated Measure No. 1,
signed the complaint alleging a violation of N.D. CENT. CODE §16-20-17.1. (1969). Id.
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and resulted in a conviction. 6 The NDEA contended that the
statute violated its constitutional right to freedom of speech. 7 Three
justices of the North Dakota Supreme Court held the statute which
required sponsors of political advertisements to disclose their
identity violated the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. 8
State v. North Dakota EducationAssociation, (NDEA) 262 N.W. 2d 731
(N.D. 1978).
The constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech was
adopted by the framers of the Constitution in reaction to the
restraints placed by England on publications of the colonists. 9
There had been a persistent effort on the part of the British for
more than a century prior to the adoption of the free speech
amendment to curtail any opinion criticizing the government.' 0
One of the methods employed by the British to quash expressions of
this sort was a tax on the material." The colonists' revolt began
when a tax of this type, stamps for newspaper duties, was sent to
the American colonies. 12 The aim of these taxes was not to relieve
the taxpayers from a burden, but to curtail the circulation of
newspapers. 13
6. Id. Sentencing, however, was deferred until June 21, 1978, subject to the condition that the
NDEA not violate the law for one year. Id.
7. Id. at 733.
8. Id. The majority in NDEA found that N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-20-17.1 (1969) violated both
the first amendment of the United States Constitution and Section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides as follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for
redress of grievances." N. D. CONST. art. I 5 9 (1889) provides in part as follows: "Every man may
freely write, speak and publish his opinions on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that
privilege."
In North Dakota, fourjustices of the Supreme Court must agree in order to declare a statute
unconstitutional. N. D. CONST. art IV § 88 (1975) provides as follows: "A majority of the supreme
court shall be necessary to constitute a quorum or to pronounce a decision, provided that the
supreme court shall not declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional unless at. least four of the
members of the court so decide." In NDEA, the majority of the court consisted ofJustice Vogel, who
wrote the opinion, ChiefJustice Erickstad, and Justice Pederson. Justice Sand, who was joined by
Justice Paulson, wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. This meant that
Justice Sand's opinion had the effect of declaring N. D. CENT. CODE § 16-20-17.1 (1969)
unconstitutional where it concurred and constitutional where it dissented. See, infra note 61-65.
9. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938). See Near v. Minnesota, ?83 U.7-697,-714
(1931), Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
10. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245 (1936). The struggle between the
proponents of suppression of antigovernment expression, and those who asserted the right of freedom
of expression was evidenced as early as 1644. In that yearJohn Milton attacked an act of Parliament
providing for censorship of the press previous to publication, in an article entitled "Appeal for the
Liberty of Unlicensed Printing." Id.
11. Id.at 246. A tax was imposed by Parliament on all newspapers and advertisements in 1712.
The major purpose of this "tax was to suppress the publication of comments and criticisms objectionable to the Crown." Id.
1-2.
Id. at 246. E-nglandsent these stamps for newspaper duties to the American colonies in 1765.
Id.
13. Id. at 246-48. The majority of newspapers curtailed were the less expensive ones, read by the
masses of the people. The opponents of these "taxes on knowledge as they were called, wanted "to -

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

Violent opposition met the taxes imposed by England and an
attempt by one American colony to follow the English example of
taxation. 14 Due to these past experiences, the framers of the
Constitution were determined to preclude both the federal and state
governments from imposing a restraint on the printing or
circulation of publications.' 5 The framer's major purpose was to
preserve the press as a vital source of information, as a free press is
"one of the great interpreters between the government and the
people.' '16 Not all restraints on expression, however, are expressly
forbidden by the first amendment. 1 7 Courts, faced with the
problem, must weigh the circumstances of each case and determine
whether the reasons in support of the regulation or the detrimental
effect of the regulation is weightier. 8
The United States Supreme Court weighed the interests of the
state against the right of freedom of speech in Talley v. California.'9
This case involved a statute which required the person who
distributed the printed any handbill to disclose his name and
address. 20 The issue presented to the Talley Court was whether or
not this statute abridged the freedom of speech and press provided
for under the United States Constitution. 2 1 In holding that this
statute was void on its face, the Talley Court based much of its
decision on historical reasoning. 22 The historical justifications used
establish and preserve the right of the English people to full information in respect of the doings or
misdoings of their government." Id. at 246-47.
14. Id. at 248. Four years before Congress proposed the first amendment, Massachusetts imposed a tax on all newspapers and magazines, and one year later imposed a tax on advertisement.
Because of the opposition which these acts were met with, the tax on newspapers and magazines imposed in 1785 was repealed in 1786, and the tax imposed on advertisement in 1787 was repealed in
1788. Id.
15. Id. at 249. The federal government was prohibited from imposing these restraints on
publications by the first amendment. This guarantee was extended to the states by the adoption of
the fourteenth amendment. Id.
16. Id. at 249. Newspapers and magazines shed more light on public and business affairs than
any other "instrumentality of publicity" which is necessary because an informed public is "the most
potent of all restraints upon misgovernment.'" Id. at 250.
17. Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 161 (1939). It is left up to the courts to decide whether
restraints on expression should be allowed or forbidden by the first amendment. Id. In addition to
restrictions on expression there may also be "time, place and manner" restriction placed upon certain speech, e.g., commercial speech, which will not offend first amendment rights. Bates v. State
Barof Arizona, _
U. S. __, 97 S. Ct. 2691, 2709 (1977).
18. 308 U.S. at 161. This weighing of the interests of the parties has been referred to as a balancingtest. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-20, at 683 (Ist ed. 1978).

19. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
20. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 61(1960). The statute provided as follows:
No person shall distribute any hand-bill in any place under any circumstances, which
does not have printed on the cover, or the face thereof, the name and address of the
following:
(a) The person who printed, wrote, compiled or manufactured the same
(b) The person who caused the same to be distributed; provided, however, that in the
case of a fictitious person or club, in addition to such fictitious name, the true names
and addresses of the owners, managers or agents of the person sponsoring said handbill shall also appear thereon.
MUNICIPAL CODE OF THE CITY OF Los ANGELES§ 28.06.
21. 362 U.S. at 60.
22. Id. at 64-65. If an author or distributor of a publication was forced to identify himself a fear
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by the Court in Talley were similar to those used by the
Constitution's framers in adopting provisions necessary to protect
free speech. 23 The Talley Court held that the campaign literature
disclosure statute was invalid because anonymity has been used
"for the most constructive purposes. "24
The question of the validity of the campaign literature
disclosure statute was addressed in Canon v. Justice Courtfor the Lake
Valley JudicialDistrict.2 The California court in this case held that
26
the statute was not an unconstitutional violation of free speech.
The statute in Canon, however, was limited to writings which
reflected upon the character of a political candidate instead of all
writings in general. 2 7 Although the Canon court felt, as the Court in
Talley did, that anonymity sometimes has useful purposes, 28 they
concluded that this anonymity all too often lends itself to "smears"
upon the candidates. 29 The California Court in Canon balanced the
public interest of having complete information and clean elections
30
with the loss of freedom of expression where the statute applied.
The court concluded that the public interest outweighed the loss in
freedom of expression.31
of reprisal would be created which would very well deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance. Id. at 65.
23. Id. at 64-65. Anonymous writings have played an important role in the progress of mankind
and have also allowed persecuted groups to criticize oppressive practices. England forced the colonies
to disclose the names of printers, writers and distributors because it would lessen the circulation of
literature critical of the English government. The Federalist Papers, written anonymously in favor of
the adoption of the Constitution, is an example of an instance when anonymity was used. Id. See supra
notes 10-16.
24. 326 U.S. at 65.
25. 61 Cal.2d 446, 393 P.2d 428, 39 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1964). The statute involved in Canon
provided as follows:
Every person is guilty of a misdemeanor who writes or causes to be written, printed,
posted. or distributed any circular, pamphlet, letter, or poster which is designed to injure or defeat any candidate for nomination or election to any public office by reflecting upon his personal character or political action, unless there appears upon the circular, pamphlet, letter, or poster, in a conspicuous place, the name and address of the
printer and either:
(a) the name and address of the chairman and secretary or the names and addresses of
at least two officers of the political or other organization issuing it; or (b) the name and
residence address, with the street and number, if any, of some voter of this State, who
is responsible for it.
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 12047 (West 1961) (repealed).
26. Crown v. Justice Court for the Lake Valley Judicial Dist., 61 Cal.2d 446, -,
393 P.2d
428, 39 Cal. Rptr. 228
- (1964). Although this statute was held by the Canon court not to violate
the guarantee of free speech, it was found to be unconstitutional in that the statute was
discriminatory because it applied only to voters. Id. at 436.
27. Id. at __
28. Id. at __,

393 P.2d at 431, 39 Cal. Rptr. at __

393 P.2d at 435, 39 Cal. Rptr. at

.

-

See Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60, 65
(1960).
29. 61 Cal.2d at __,
393 P.2d at 435, 39 Cal. Rptr. at __
The Canon court also felt that
requiring the disclosure of the sponsors reduced irresponsibility and also enables the public to appraise the source. Id.
30. Id. at -. , 393 P.2d at 436, 39 Cal. Rptr. at -. The Canon court held that in the instance
where the statute was applicable, the marginal decrease in freedom of expression was exceeded by
the public interest in complete information and clean elections. Id.
31. Id.
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Generally, courts faced with the issue of the constitutionality
of campaign literature disclosure laws balance the competing
interests. 32 A federal law which required the disclosure of campaign
material sponsors was upheld in United States v. Scott. 33 The
defendant in the Scott case argued the fear of reprisal if he was
required to identify himself, but this argument failed to persuade
the court. 34 The court in Scott concluded that the value of the statute
to the public outweighed the infringement on the defendant's
rights. 35 Not all public interests in disclosure of the source of a
communication, however, will be sufficient to uphold all campaign
literature disclosure laws. 36 In fact, any statute which requires the
author of a publication to reveal hisher identity will create problems
of its constitutionality under the first amendment. 37 When a
compelling state interest is found to be sufficient to uphold a
disclosure statute, the limitations imposed by that statute "must be
no greater than is necessary to protect the compelling interest. "38
In People v. Duryea, 39 the court balanced the state's interest
against the infringement on the first amendment rights. 4 0 The
32. See United States v. Scott, 195 F. Supp. 440 (D.N.D. 1961); Canon v. Justice Court for the
Lake ValleyJudicial Dist., 61 Cal.2d 446, 393 P.2d 428, 39 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1964); State v. Fulton,
337 So.2d 886 (La. 1976); Commonwealth v. Dennis, 368 Mass. 92, 329 N.E.2d 706 (1975); People
v. Duryea, 76 Misc.2d 948, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1974), aff'd, 44 A.D.2d 663, 354 N.Y.S.2d 129
(1974).
33. 195 F. Supp. 440 (D.N.D. 1961). The federal statute in question in Scott was 18 U.S.C. 5
612 (1950) (repealed 1976) which provided as follows:
Whoever willfully publishes or distributes or causes to be published or distributed, or
for the purpose of publishing or distributing the same, knowingly deposits for mailing
or delivery or causes to be deposited for mailing or delivery, or, except in cases of employees of the Post Office Department in the official discharge of their duties,
knowingly transports or causes to be transported in interstate commerce any card,
pamphlet, circular, poster, dodger, advertisement, writing, or other statement
relating to or concerning any person who has publicly declared his intention to seek the
office of President, or Vice President of the United States, or Senator or Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress, in a primary, general or
special election, or convention of a political party, or has caused or permitted his intention to do so to be publicly declared, which does not contain the names of the persons, associations, committees, and corporations responsible for the publication or
distribution of the same, and the names of the officers of each such association, committee, or corporation, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both.
Provisions similar to those formerly found at 18 U.S.C. 5 612 were enacted as part of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 § 323 (current version at 2 S. S. C. § 441(d) (1971)).
34. United States v. Scott, 195 F. Supp. 440, 443 (D.N.D. 1961). The Scott court felt that this
fear was "highly speculative and conjectural" and if reprisal did happen to occur there were courts to
"protect the intimidated from the intimdators." Id.
35. Id. at 444.
36. Commonwealth v. Dennis, 368 Mass. 92, __
, 329 N.E.2d 706, 709 (1975).
37. Id. at 708.
38. Id. at 710.
39. 76 Misc.2d 948, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1974), aff'd, 44A.D.2d 663, 354 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1974).
40. People v. Duryea, 76 Misc.2d 948,
-, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 984 (1974), aff'd, A.D.2d 663,
354 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1974). The statute in question in Duryea provided as follows:
No person shall print, publish, reproduce or distribute in quantity, nor order to be
printed, published, reproduced or distributed by any method any handbill, pamphlet,
circular, postcard, placard or letter for another which contains any statement, notice,
information, allegation or other material concerning any political party, candidate,
committee, person, proposition or amendment to the state constitution, whether in
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Duryea court stated that the state's interest must be compelling
because the scales were preweighted "by virtue of the importance
of the [fjirst [a]mendment. "41 It was felt by the Duryea court that
the statute requiring the sponsors of political publications to
identify themselves was too narrow,4 2 and that alternatives existed
which would alleviate the problem.4 3 In upholding the right to
publish anonynous writings, however, the court in Duryea put faith
in the common man to look at the anonymity together with the
message and then decide "what is 'responsible,' what is valuable,
44
and what is truth."
The courts faced with statutes that compel the disclosure of
sponsors of campaign literature, generally, will weigh the interests
of public policy in having such a statute against the extent which
the statute infringes upon the freedom of speech.4 5 This balancing
favor of or against a political party, candidate, committee, person, proposition or
amendment to the state constitution, in connection with any election of public officers,
party officials, candidates for nomination for public office, party position, proposition
or amendment to the state constitution without also printing or reproducing thereon
legibly and in the English language the name and post-office address of the printer
thereof and of the person or committee at whose instance or request such handbill,
pamphlet, circular, postcard, placard or letter is so printed, published, reproduced or
distributed, and of the person who ordered such printing, publishing, reproduction or
distribution, and no person nor committee shall so print, publish, reproduce or
distribute or order to be printed, published, reproduced or distributed any such handbill, pamphlet, circular, post card, placecard or letter without also printing,
publishing or reproducing his or its name and post-office address thereon. A violation
of the provisions of this section shall constitute a misdemeanor.
The term "printer" as used in this section means the principal who or which by
independent contractual relationship is responsible directly to the person or committee
at whose instance or request a handbill, pamphlet, circular, post card, placard or letter is printed, published, reproduced or distributed by such principal, and does not include a person working for or employed by such a principal.
ELECTION LAW OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 457 (1967).
41.76 Misc. 2d at __, 351 N. Y. S. 2d at 984.
42. Id. at __
, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 995. The Duryea court concluded that the statute was "not
narrowly enough drawn to further the [s]tate's legitimate interest" because "it is in no way limited
to deterring compaign defamation and financing violations." The statute was held too broad by the
Duryea court because anonymity was a crime when anyone printed or distributed anything dealing
with any candidate or issue connected with any party or government election. Id.
43. Id. at __
, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 993. The Duryea case suggested three alternatives that could be
used, but did not rule on any of them because they were not questions before the court. The first
alternative was a statute strictly limited to the activities of campaign organizations justified by the
same interests that the laws dealing with contributions and expenditures had. A statute of this type
may not otherwise infringe on first amendment rights, however. The second alternative given by the
Duryea court was "a statute strictly limited to preventing ethnic, racial or religious slurs." The third
alternative statute was one "strictly limited to attacks on the purely personal character of a candidate." Id.
44. Id. at __,
351 N. Y. S. 2d at 996.
45. See supra note 32. There are generally four public policy reasons given for having campaign
literature disclosure statutes. These justifications were stated in Printing Industries of Golf Coast v.
Hill, 382 F. Supp. 801 (S.D. Tex. 1974). The Hillcourt stated the reasons as follows:
1. Responsibility for fraudulent, deceitful, libelous, or falsely attributed statements in
political advertisements can be ascertained.
2. The informed voter is entitled to know who is supporting particular candidates or
positions and what 'media companies' are molding the image of the candidate.
3. The opposing candidates are in a better position to reply to campaign accusations.
4. The actual advertising expenditures of candidates are more easily determined by
both the [s]tate and the public.
Id. at 811.
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test was undertaken by the North Dakota Supreme Court in
NDEA. 4 6 The North Dakota court began its discussion of the
constitutionality of the statute, requiring the disclosure of the
sponsors of campaign literature, by deciding that the statute did
apply to this case. 47 In holding the campaign literature disclosure
48
statute unconstitutional, the majority in NDEA found Talley to be
4 9 Although the appellee tried to distinguish the Talley
controlling.
case from NDEA, the majority rejected the argument and Talley
was considered applicable. 50 As in Talley, the NDEA majority
relied on the historical basis for the adoption of the first
amendment. 5
The majority in NDEA considered cases in which Talley had
been successfully distinguished and campaign literature disclosure
statutes were held constitutional; however, these cases failed to
persuade the NDEA majority. 52 Canon was felt, by the majority of
the North Dakota court, as being correct in its distinguishing the
46. 262 N. W.2d at 736.
47. Id. at 733-34. In deciding that N.D. CENT. CODE S 16-20-17.1 (1969) applied to this case,
the first issue that the NDEA court faced was whether or not the publication was a newspaper. The
court found this to be immaterial because even if the publication was not a newspaper it fell "within
the description 'any other public means' forbidden by the statute." 262 N.W.2d at 733.
The second issue that faced the North Dakota court was whether the appeal to vote "no" was
an advertisement. The court concluded that the appeal was "no different from the advertisements of
the commercial advertisers" which placed an advertisement within the means of the statute. Id.
The third issue in NDEA was whether there was a public distribution of the publication. The
court found there was because the publication was distributed to "a considerable number of people"
and "was intended to be read bv a substantial segment of the public, including library patrons." Id.
In the fourth issue of whether the trial court erred in tailing to instruct the jury as to
culpability, the NDEA court held there was no error because the statute "contain [edl no requirement
as to the degree of culpability." Id. at 733-34.
The fifth issue was whether or not the trial court erred in failing to define "newspaper." TheNorth Dakota Supreme Court concluded that because "newspaper" was a common term, readily
understood, it need not be defined in the absence of a request for a definition. Id. at 734.
48. See supra notes 19-24.
49. 262 N.W.2d at 735.
50. Id. The argument made by the States Attorney to distinguish Talley was that the statute in
Talley "applied to all pamphlets, while our statute applie[d] only to publications relating to political
matters." This distinction did not persuade the majority because the publications referred to in
Talley included political material. Id.
51. Id. The majority pointed out that anonymity has been very important. As an example, the
majority in NDEA mentioned men who wrote documents under pseudonyms such as "the secondt,
third and fourth Presidents as well as the first Vice President, the first Chief Justice and the first
Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of State of the United States." The majority went on to also
mention Common Sense, written by Thomas Paine under the pseudonym "An Englishman." The importance of these anonymous writings, as the NDEA majority saw them, was without these
documents the "Revolutionary War would not have been won." Id.
Justice Sand, however, did not agree with the historical reasoning used by the majority. He
contended that annonymity may have been necessary at the time of the Revolutionary War, but it
was not necessary today. Id. at 737 (Sand,J., concurring and dissenting).
Justice Sand also felt that the holding in Tallev was too broad because it covered any handbill
and not just election and compaign literature. He agreed that if the statute in Talley had been limited
to only campaigns then the statute probably would have been upheld. This was based on the
statement in Talley that a disclosure law would be upheld if there was a legitimate evil that was to be
prevented. Justice Sand distinguished between anonymous criticism of the government, which he
thought should be permitted. and anonymous criticism of candidates, which should not be
permitted. Id. at 737-38. In other words, Justice Sand felt the campaign literature disclosure statute
was "invalid. but only as it applie[dl to measures, as distinguished from candidates." Id. at 741.
52. Id. at 735-36.
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statute in question in that case from the one in Talley, but it was not
persuasive because Canon was not directly on point with the NDEA
case. 53 The distinguishing factor in the campaign literature
disclosure statute involved in Canon was the state's interest in
This factor, however, did not extend
avoiding political "smears.
to the NDEA case as North Dakota has a separate statute dealing
with political smears. 55 Along with Talley, the majority placed
reliance in people to judge the anonymous writings themselves for
what the publications are worth. 56 It was felt by the majority in
NDEA that the weight of the freedom of speech should prevail over
the weight given to the state's interest. 5 7 The majority left it up to
the people to judge the writings for themselves, and also for the
anonymous writers or sponsors who make the campaign literature
to act decently.

58

As an alternative, the majority suggested "the

passage of a more carefully drawn statute designed to meet the
specific evil. " 9However, under the present statutory provisions
the "constitutional imperatives must prevail. "60
The North Dakota Constitution requires that in order for a
statute to be declared unconstitutional there must be at least four
members of the court in agreement. 6 1 The majority of the court in
NDEA consisted of three justices, and there was a separate opinion
with the remaining two justices concurring in part and dissenting in
part.6 2 The separate opinion concurred in declaring the campaign
53. Id. at 734. Canon successfully distinguished Talley because the campaign literature disclosure
statute in Canon showed the necessary compelling interest which outbalanced the effect on freedom of
speech. The statute in Canon did impair the freedom of expression to some extent, but it was outweighed by the public interest of avoiding political smears and character assassination. Id. at 735-36.
54. Canon v. Justice Court for the lake ValleyJudicial Dist., 393 P.2d 428, 435 (1964). See supra
note 30.
55. 262 N.W.2d at 736. N.D. CENT. CODE S 16-20-17.3 (Supp. 1975) provides as follows:
No person shall knowingly sponsor any political advertisement containing false information, whether on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office,
initiated measure, referred measure, or constitutional amendment, and whether such
publication shall be by radio, television, newspaper, pamphlet, folder, display cards,
signs, posters or billboard advertisements, or by any other public means. Any person
who shall violate the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a Class A
misdemeanor.
56. 262 N.W.2d at 736.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. See supra note 43.
60. Id.
61. N.D. CONST. art. IV § 88 (1975). See supra note 8.
62. 262 N.W.2d 731. See supra note 8. Justice Sand, concurring and dissenting, agreed with the
majority insofar as there was a need for anonymity in political publications at the time of the
American Revolution. He did not agree, however, that "the [f]irst [a]mendment was adopted and
designed to assure or protect anonymity in the election process." What Justice Sand felt was that
there was justification for the anonymous ciriticizing of the government, but no justification existed
for the anonymous criticism of candidates. 262 N.W.2d at 737.Justice Sand stated that it was wrong
"to rely upon the pre-independence condition of our Nation to justify anonymity." His reasoning
was the changes in the electoral system since colonial time. Id. at 741.
In balancing the rights of the public to publish anonymous campaign literature against the
benefits the public would receive in being able to identify the sponsors of these publications, Justice
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literature statute unconstitutional as it applied to initiated
measures, but valid as . to candidates. 63 Because of the
constitutional provision that four judges must agree to find a statute
unconstitutional, this separate opinion resulted in the campaign
literature disclosure statute being unconstitutional in part and valid
in part. 6 4 Therefore, the campaign literature disclosure statute is
unconstitutional as it applies to initiated measures, but
65
constitutional as it applies to candidates.
JOHN

T.

TRAYNOR, JR.

Sand felt that N.D. CENT. CODE S 16-20-17.1 (1969) was unconstitutional as it applied to measures,
but valid as it applied to candidates. In deciding the campaign literature disclosure statute constitutional as it applied to candidates, Justice Sand reasoned first, the candidate had "a right to be
informed who [was] criticizing him;" second, "[t]he need for anonymity...
[was] not as great as it
was at the time of the pre-independence of our Nation:" third, "the people [had] a right to know who
[was] sponsoring ....
which candidate." Id.
63. Id. See supra note 62.
64. N.D. CONST. art. IV § 88 (1975). See supra note 8.
65. Id. The required number ofjustices agreeing was met for declaring the campaign literature
disclosure statute unconstitutional as it applied to initiated measures, but not as it applied to candidates. 262 N.W.2d at 741.

